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Just about to enter her office building, on a
busy downtown Washington, D.C., street,
Mary Z. was attacked from behind. In full
view of numerous witnesses, her assailant
beat her savagely,
breaking her nose,
cheekbone, and sev-
eral ribs. By the
time the police ar-
rived, the assailant
had fled. The police
questioned no one
except the victim, made no report, made no
attempt to apprehend the perpetrator. Why?
Because the police had learned the assailant
was not a stranger: he was Mary's husband.
This act of brutality was a family matter-
not police business. As a result, Mary was
hospitalized, her husband free to terrorize
her again at will.1
Mary's story is true and, unfortunately, is
not an isolated incident. Many District of Co-
lumbia police officers base their response to
domestic violence calls on the relationship
between the assailant and the victim, not on
the nature of the crime committed. A dou-
ble standard has existed: a beating by a hus-
band or boyfriend is treated as less serious
than a beating by a
stranger.
With the adoption
of the Prevention of
Domestic Violence
Amendment Act of
1990,2 the District
of Columbia joins a
growing number of jurisdictions that require
a police officer to make an arrest where
there is probable cause to believe domestic
violence has occurred. 3 This mandatory ar-
rest legislation is a necessary antidote to the
pervasive and longstanding failure of the
criminal justice system to protect domestic
violence victims.
D.C's New
Mandatory
Arrest Law
BY CATHERINE F. KLEIN
Catherine F. Klein is director of the Family
Abuse Project, Columbus School of Law, the
Catholic University of America (CUA), and a
member of the D.C. Coalition Against Domestic
Violence. She is currently a visiting professor
at Washington College of Law, the American
University. The author greatly appreciates the
research assistance provided by Kathryn M.
Doan, a 1991 CUA law school graduate.
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Law Enforcement Policy
ntil 1987 the D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department had no specific internal
policy for handling domestic violence
cases. 4 What limited training the officers received
taught them that domestic violence should be
mediated and arrest avoided. 6 In 1986 a group of
George Washington University law students,' with
the assistance of the D.C. Coalition Against
Domestic Violence (DCCADV), 7 petitioned the po-
lice department to develop guidelines recommend-
ing arrest rather than mediation as the preferred
response to domestic violence.
As a result of the petition and growing commu-
nity pressure, in June 1987 the Metropolitan Po-
lice Department adopted a "pro-arrest" domes-
tic violence policy through promulgation of
General Order 701.5, which stressed that arrest
was the appropriate police response to domestic
violence, but fell short of requiring it. General
Order 701.5 provides that" [i]n cases where prob-
able cause exists to believe a criminal offense has
occurred, an immediate arrest should be made
whenever possible."8
In an effort to find out how well this pro-arrest
policy was being implemented, the DCCADV un-
dertook a major empirical study of police prac-
tices under the new policy, based on extensive
interviews of 274 victims of domestic abuse in the
District.9 Two populations were targeted: victims
of domestic violence who went to the Citizen's
Complaint Center' 0 for help and those who went
directly to the Superior Court to file a petitfon
for a civil protection order. 1 The interviews took
place one day a week at each site from Novem-
ber 1987 through March 1988.12
The results were shocking. Six months after the
issuance of General Order 701.5 essentially noth-
ing had changed: the police were still routinely
telling victims that there was nothing the police
could do even when there was clear evidence that
a crime had taken place. Some of the stories told
include:
* Two weeks after a forty-seven-year-old
woman left her husband, she went to his auto shop
to discuss financial matters. He beat her severely
with a metal pipe and she was taken to the hospi-
tal. Police responded to her requests for help by
asking her husband to go to the Citizen's Com-
plaint Center with her. No further action was
taken by the police.' 3
0 When one woman's ex-boyfriend came to her
home to retrieve his belongings, she called the
police. Because of his past violence, she was afraid
of him. After she called the police, the boyfriend
dragged her into the bedroom, kicked her in the
face, and beat her until she was unconscious. Fi-
nally, after a neighbor called the police again, an
officer arrived and took the woman to the hospi-
tal. The police, however, refused to take further
action, despite the woman's request that they ar-
rest the abuser. 4
* A husband and wife were at a friend's house.
They quarreled and she went home. Her husband
came home the next morning and immediately be-
gan to beat her. He slapped her, choked her,
threw her on the floor repeatedly, pushed her chin
to make her bite her tongue, and eventually tried
to rape her. The abuse continued for two hours.
Eventually, the woman fled and called the police
from a friend's house. The police dispatcher told
her nothing could be done because she had left
the site of the abuse and suggested she go to the
Citizen's Complaint Center. '1
The police made arrests in only 5 percent of the
domestic violence incidents covered by the sur-
vey.'1 The DCCADV study found that a police
officer's decision to make an arrest had little to
do with the severity of the victim's injuries. For
example, in none of the cases where the victim
was admitted to the hospital for treatment was
the suspected abuser arrested.II Nor did the vic-
tim's request that an assailant be arrested (32.5
percent of the cases) make much difference. Is
Instead, the single most important factor in de-
termining arrest appeared to be the suspect's at-
titude toward the police. If the suspect failed to
respect the authority of the officers, arrest was
much more likely. '9 Another important factor in-
fluencing arrest was the presence of property dam-
age. The arrest rate for incidents involving dam-
age to a car was 28.6 percent. In contrast, the
arrest rate in incidents involving a bleeding vic-
tim was only 13.7 percent. 20
While there were some officers who responded
to domestic violence victims with compassion and
understanding, many more displayed shocking in-
sensitivity to the suffering and legal rights of
domestic violence victims. In the face of the po-
lice department's failure to implement its own pro-
arrest policy or to change its de facto policy of
"arrest as a last resort" or even no arrest, the
DCCADV and other concerned groups and in-
dividuals began to demand that change in law en-
forcement policy and practice be legislated by the
Council of the District of Columbia in the form
of a mandatory arrest law.
Breaking the Cycle of
Violence
ritics of mandatory arrest laws maintain
that such laws deprive police officers of
needed flexibility in determining whether
an arrest should be made, arguing that "not every
situation where probable cause exists is suitable
for immediate arrest.'21
However, studies both in the District and
elsewhere 22 have shown that police routinely
abuse their discretion regarding arrests in domestic
violence cases, failing to take suspected abusers
into custody even when probable cause exists to
do so. Thus, far from according special treatment
to domestic violence victims, the mandatory ar-
rest law is an attempt to ensure that they are
merely given the protection afforded other vic-
tims of crime.
Moreover, arrest has been found to be the most
effective way to break the cycle of violence. Ini-
tially, law enforcement experts thought that there
was little that the police could do to prevent
domestic violence. However, this attitude began
to change in the late 1970s.2 3 In 1977 the Police
Foundation conducted a study in Kansas City,
Kansas, that showed that in 85 percent of domes-
tic homicide cases, police had been called to the
home at least once before, and in 50 percent of
these cases five Or more times, in the two years
prior to the homicide.24 While the study did not
address the issue of what exactly the police could
do to stop the violence, it revealed that without
effective police intervention domestic violence
tends to recur and the level of violence escalates.
In 1981 the Minneapolis, Minnesota, police
department agreed to participate in a landmark
experiment sponsored by the National Institute
of Justice to test the effectiveness of three differ-
ent police responses to domestic violence. 25 The
objective was to determine how effective the var-
ious methods were in reducing the likelihood of
future violent incidents. The Minneapolis experi-
ment, which applied only to misdemeanor domes-
tic assaults, instructed police officers to respond
in one of three ways: give advice or informally
mediate; order the suspect to leave the premises
for eight hours; or arrest the suspect. The type
of response was randomly assigned.
The study found that when suspects were ar-
rested, the likelihood of a recurrence of the vio-
lence decreased. Only 10 percent of the suspects
who were arrested were involved in repeat oc-
currences of domestic violence within the next
six months, compared with 24 percent of those
who were sent away from the scene and 19 per-
cent of those who received mediation or advice.
Thus, the results showed that the suspects who
were not arrested were twice as likely to commit
another domestic assault within the succeeding
six months as those who were arrested.
Following this important study, Minneapolis and
other jurisdictions adopted mandatory arrest laws
and policies. The experiences of jurisdictions with
mandatory arrest have been extremely encourag-
ing. After Newport News, Virginia, adopted a
mandatory arrest law, domestic violence-related
homicides fell from an average of 12 to 13 a year
to 1 in the first six months of 1988.21 In 1987,
44 percent of the homicides in Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, were domestic. In the first two months af-
ter the police adopted a mandatory arrest policy,
that figure dropped to zero. 27 The Duluth, Min-
nesota, police department adopted a mandatory
arrest policy in 1981, and the city experienced
a 47 percent drop in domestic violence calls be-
tween 1982 and 1986.28 Similarly, after Connect-
icut passed a mandatory arrest law in 1986, there
was a 28 percent drop in reported incidents of
domestic violence. 29
The message is clear. Left unchecked, domes-
tic violence typically escalates in frequency and
severity.30 Failure to arrest an abuser not only
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deprives a woman of the immediate protection she
is entitled to, but also implicitly teaches the abuser
that his behavior is acceptable, that he can es-
cape responsibility for the abuse. This, in turn,
makes it more likely that the abuse will be
repeated in the future, perpetuating the cycle of
violence.
The District's Mandatory
Arrest Law
he District of Columbia Prevention of
Domestic Violence Amendment Act was
first introduced by city council member
Hilda Mason in 1989. Mason and her staff had
worked closely with the DCCADV and other
domestic violence advocates in drafting the bill.
In June 1989 the city council's judiciary commit-
tee held public hearings on the proposed manda-
tory arrest law. Thirty-four witnesses testified,
representing a wide spectrum of the community.
The witnesses were nearly unanimous in their sup-
port for the legislation, stressing the importance
of treating domestic violence as a crime and hold-
ing the abuser responsible for his actions. 3'
After an amended bill was introduced in 1990,
an effort was made to include a provision permit-
ting "pretrial diversion" of domestic violence
defendants into counseling programs. Under this
proposal, abusers could be referred to counseling
as an alternative to criminal prosecution. How-
ever, prosecutors in other jurisdictions, as well
as persons involved in batterers' counseling pro-
grams, wrote to the members of the judiciary com-
mittee urging them to reconsider this provision.32
In their experience, batterers' counseling is suc-
cessful only if it is presented as an alternative to
incarceration, not simply as an alternative to
prosecution, because batterers minimize the seri-
ousness of their actions. Accordingly, batterers
will tend to be resistant to counseling unless the
gravity of their offenses is clearly impressed upon
them before the counseling starts. Thus, while an
important part of the solution, the comments
received by the city council indicated that coun-
seling was a poor substitute for criminal sanctions.
As a result of these efforts, the pretrial diversion
provision was eliminated.
City council members were also concerned about
liability to domestic violence victims if the police
did not adequately respond to the problem. 3  In
recent years an increasing number of domestic vio-
lence victims have successfully sued police depart-
ments, individual officers, and on occasion prose-
cutors for failing to protect their rights.34 Council
members were persuaded that a firm mandatory
arrest policy would significantly reduce the city's
exposure to such claims by improving police
response.
The mandatory arrest bill was approved unani-
mously by the Council of the District of Colum-
bia on July 10, 1990, and signed by Mayor Barry
on July 13, 1990. The bill became effective on
April 30, 1991.
How the New Law Works
he Prevention of Domestic Violence
Amendment Act includes four important
components: arrest, written reports, po-
lice training, and recordkeeping policies.
Arrest. A police officer must arrest if the officer
has probable cause to believe that a person is
responsible for an intrafamily offense 35 that ei-
ther resulted in physical injury, including pain or
illness,36 or was intended to cause a reasonable
fear of injury or death. 37 It does not matter
whether the police officer saw what happened. 38
Nor is a warrant required. The law adds a new
category of warrantless arrest to the District's
criminal code. 39
This so-called mandatory arrest law does not
mean that everyone accused of a domestic crime
is automatically subject to arrest. The police of-
ficer must first determine that probable cause ex-
ists before an arrest can be made. Police officers
do this successfully every day when investigating
other types of crimes. However, until enactment
of this law, the District's law enforcement officers
have treated domestic violence cases differently.
The new law makes it clear that this type of a
double standard will no longer be tolerated.
Written reports. Any police officer who
responds to a domestic violence call is now re-
quired to file a written report that includes the
officer's disposition of the case.40 This report,
commonly referred to as an incident report, must
be prepared regardless of whether an arrest was
made. 4
Incident reports are crucial for several reasons.
They can help establish that the violence is not
just an isolated incident but part of a pattern of
abuse. An officer may lack the probable cause
needed to make an arrest on an initial call. How-
ever, if the officer responds to a subsequent call
at the same location, the officer should take the
report from the previous incident into account in
determining whether probable cause now exists
to make an arrest. In addition, the reports can
help establish grounds for a civil protection or-
der. Often, in a civil protection order hearing, it
is the victim's word against her abuser's, and the
report can be useful in corroborating her story.
Moreover, and perhaps most important, the re-
port requirement forces the officer to talk to peo-
ple, to listen to their stories. Victim interviews
after the Minneapolis study emphasized that the
effectiveness of the police response increased dra-
matically when officers took the time to listen to
victims. Finally, requiring written reports in-
creases police accountability and provides a data-
base for studying the extent of domestic violence
in our community.
Police training. The law mandates a minimum
of 20 hours of training on domestic violence for
all new recruits and 8 hours of training for cur-
rent officers.4 2 The law outlines specific training
areas: the nature and causes of domestic violence;
the legal rights and remedies of the victim and
perpetrator; and the duties of police officers to
enforce the arrest provision of the law and to of-
fer assistance to the victim.
Training is important not only as a means of
familiarizing police officers with the contents of
the new law, but also as a way to enable officers
to confront their own attitudes about the propri-
ety of using violence to resolve domestic disputes.
Previously, some police officers may have been
reluctant to treat domestic violence as a criminal
matter because they believed that there was noth-
ing wrong with hitting a wife or girlfriend. In fact,
recent studies show that police officers are as
likely as anyone else to use violence against fam-
ily members.43
Recordkeeping policies. Finally, the Metropoli-
tan Police Department must maintain a computer-
ized record of civil protection orders and bench
warrants issued in connection with an abuse
case.44 This provision will assist women in obtain-
ing and enforcing civil protection orders.
The Problem of Dual Arrest
major area of concern surrounding man-Adatory arrest laws has been dual arrests,
which occur when the victim is arrested
along with the abuser. A dual arrest is rarely ap-
propriate in domestic violence cases. Police
officers, following protocols used in investigating
all other types of crimes, can almost always de-
termine who is the aggressor and who is acting
in self-defense. The overwhelming majority of
domestic violence victims are female, and per-
petrators are male. National crime statistics show
that approximately 95 percent of domestic vio-
lence victims are women.45 While women some-
times use physical force against their partners,
it is often in self-defense.4" Furthermore, the ef-
fects of male violence are far more serious when
measured by the frequency and severity of the
injuries.47
Despite this reality, in some jurisdictions,
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usually during the initial implementation period
of a mandatory arrest policy, dual arrests have
occurred all too frequently. There appear to be
two main reasons: some police officers, resent-
ing the loss of some of their discretion, were trying
to sabotage the mandatory arrest law; and some
officers, because of inadequate training, genuinely
misunderstood the provisions of the law.4 8
Jurisdictions have responded to the problem of
dual arrests by new legislation and enhanced po-
lice training. For example, in 1984, immediately
after Washington State passed its mandatory ar-
rest law, many police officers began making un-
warranted dual arrests. The problem was handled
in that jurisdiction by amending the legislation
to provide that the police are to arrest only the
"primary aggressor" in situations where both par-
ties have used violence. 49 This new provision, cou-
pled with a better police training program, helped
to reduce dramatically the number of dual
arrests.50
The DCCADV, mindful of what had happened
in Washington State in the absence of a primary-
aggressor provision, successfully lobbied to have
this language included in the initial draft of the
District's proposed mandatory arrest law. This
earlier version of the bill stated that an officer
was required to make an arrest if the officer had
probable cause to believe that the person "was
a primary aggressor and committed an intrafam-
ily offense. '15 In determining who was the pri-
mary aggressor, the officer was to take several
factors into account, including the relative degree
of injury inflicted by both parties and the exis-
tence of a prior history of violence.
Unfortunately, the primary-aggressor language
was not included in the law as enacted. The de-
cision to drop this provision may prove to have
an adverse impact on victims of domestic violence.
The experience of other states has shown that
such a provision may be necessary if domestic vio-
lence victims are not to be further victimized by
a law designed to help them. The Metropolitan
Police Department and the community need to
monitor this area closely. Amendment of the Dis-
trict's law may be in order if similar problems oc-
cur here.5 2
The Role of Prosecutors
lthough the new mandatory arrest law
signals an important change in the way
law enforcement officials are to respond
to incidents of domestic violence, it will be of
limited value unless our local prosecutors, the U.S.
Attorney's Office, aggressively prosecute those
who have been arrested. Prosecutors play a key
role in domestic violence cases. If the U.S. At-
torney's Office fails to prosecute domestic violence
cases with the same vigor as nondomestic crimes,
the effectiveness of the mandatory arrest law will
be undermined. Police are traditionally reluctant
to make an arrest if they think the suspect will
not be prosecuted.53 And once again, abusers will
be sent a tacit message that they can act with tic violence cases involve many complex factors.
impunity. Many victims appear ambivalent about pressing
Historically, prosecutors have not treated charges because they are facing pressure or threats
domestic violence as a serious crime and have used from the abuser to drop the case.
restrictive policies to screen out otherwise Tragically, many women's fears about the dan-
meritorious cases. The U.S. Commission on Civil ger of participation in the criminal process are
Rights found that prosecutors often apply more well founded. A National Institute of Justice study
restrictive filing and charging policies to domes- concluded that a domestic violence victim is es-
tic assaults than to other types of assaults. 4 Prose- pecially vulnerable to retaliation or threats by the
cutors also tend to believe that battered women defendant during the pretrial period.57 Moreover,
are unwilling to cooperate with the criminal prose- national crime statistics show that in almost 75
cution of abusive men, that this belief is commu- percent of reported domestic assaults, the part-
nicated to victims, and that this preconception ners were already divorced or separated.5" Data
swiftly becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.5 5  from the National Crime Survey show that once
Recently, prosecutors' offices in several juris- a person is victimized by domestic violence, the
dictions have made domestic violence cases a pri- risk of being victimized again is high.59 There-
ority, and are prosecuting cases resolutely and suc- fore, successful domestic violence prosecution pro-
cessfully. 56 Their successes illustrate that victim grams must work closely with the victim to mon-
reluctance is a myth. Most domestic violence vic- itor compliance with pretrial release conditions
tims, given the opportunity and provided with the and must respond firmly to violations.
necessary support, will cooperate fully with prose- Moreover, prosecutors must make it clear to the
cutors. Successful programs recognize that domes- victim and her abuser that it is the state, not the
victim, that is pressing charges. They must com-
municate clearly that domestic violence is not only
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE a crime against an individual but a crime against
TRAINING PROGRAM the state, and the state has an interest in seeingthe abuser held accountable.60
Domestic violence is a community Unfortunately, in the District of Columbia the
problem, demanding a community re- U.S. Attorney's Office continues to enforce poli-
sponse. The criminal justice system's cies that place the onus of prosecution in domes-
response to domestic violence must tic violence cases on the victim. Most significantly,
be part of a larger community effort the U.S. Attorney's Office retuires that domes-
to end the devastating consequences tic violence victims be present at the office on the
of violence within the family, morning following the offense as a precondition
Private lawyers also have an Impor- to the filing of criminal charges. If the victim fails
tant role. Domestic violence victims to appear for any reason (unless "physically un-
desperately need representation to able" to appear), the office will not press charges.
obtain civil protection orders, Thus, if the police fail to inform the battered
divorces, custody and child support, woman of this obligation, if she is unable to take
as well as other types of civil relief, time off from work without advance notice, if she
Domestic violence victims who are un- is unable to find child care, or if she is unable
represented we much less likely to ob- to appear for any other reason, the abuser could
tain the relief they need from the civil be released without so much as a warning.
courts.1 Lawyers also can help clients In sharp contrast, when prosecuting other types
survive the criminal process. of crimes, including nondomestic assaults, the
in order to address this need In our U.S. Attorney's Office works with police officers
community, the Public Service Actlvl- to prepare and swear out an affidavit describing
ties Corporation of the D.C. Bar is the facts of the crime. This affidavit provides the
sponsoring a daylong, intensive train- basis for criminal charges. The crime victim need
ing program on domestic violence on not appear.
Friday, December 13. Attending this Requiring domestic violence victims to appear
training and agreeing to represent a for papering is bad policy. The Attorney General's
domestic violence victim is one Impor- Task Force on Family Violence, 6' the U.S. Depart-
tant way for Bar members to become ment of Justice's National Institute of Justice, 2
involved in the ongoing struggle to Im- and the National Council of Juvenile and Family
prove the District's response to Court Judges 3 have criticized this and other simi-
domestic violence. lar requirements for prosecution. Furthermore, the
experiences of other cities and states where man-
1P. Finn & S. Colson, Civil Protection Orders: datory arrest has been in effect show that this
Legislation, Current Court Practice, and En. policy is unnecessary to achieve even the stated
forcerent (1990). 
-C.F.K. purposes of the U.S. Attorney's Office: to get in-
formation from the victim and to ensure that the
victim is willing to cooperate with the prosecution.
It is clear that domestic violence training for
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prosecutors is also essential. If prosecutors become
familiar with the dynamics of domestic abuse, they
will be better prepared to address victims' con-
cerns and provide the necessary support. Success-
ful prosecution programs try to match the goals
of the prosecutor and the victim. For example,
a woman may want the violence stopped but not
want to see her husband go to jail. She may be
more willing to cooperate if the prosecutor agrees
to ask for postconviction placement in a counsel-
ing program for batterers instead of
incarceration.t
4
Successful criminal justice programs also make
extensive use of victim advocates who work closely
with the prosecutors. A victim advocate serves
several important functions in a domestic violence
case. 65 The advocate can help investigate and pre-
pare the case; provide early and consistent con-
tact with the victim, helping her to explore any
reasons why she may be reluctant to testify; help
prepare the victim to testify in court; and assist
the victim in developing a support system by link-
ing her with available community services. 6 t The
DCCADV is currently working on instituting a vic-
tim advocate program in the District that would
be independent of the U.S. Attorney's Office but
would work in close coordination with it.
A Community Problem
o longer can our community tolerate the
historical double standard applied in
domestic violence cases: providing
domestic violence victims with less protection and
consideration than victims abused by total
strangers. Experience shows that strong measures
are needed to combat the extraordinary accep-
tance our society has had toward violence in the
home. Mandatory arrest is one such measure.
Mandatory arrest can be an effective means to
deter future domestic violence. Although its im-
plementation needs to be hastened and closely
monitored, the new law is a welcome change. The
law brings the District of Columbia into line with
other progressive jurisdictions. In addition to the
Metropolitan Police Department, the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office has a key role to play in determining
the success of the law. A coordinated criminal jus-
tice response is required. There is a lot at stake.
The cost to our community in lost lives and
resources is a constant reminder that domestic vio-
lence is not just a family matter. 1
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